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The automobile insurance industry is up in arms after a decade of consumer
friendly Ohio Supreme Court decisions. The insurance industry and
commentators have noted the trend of judicial activism in interpreting
insurance contracts. These decisions have been overwhelmingly in favor of
consumers and against insurance companies. The court has been faced with a
Hobson's choice. 3 Stare decisis has been replaced by the court because of the
dilemma the court faced between diverging public policies and private
interests. The 90's have been a hallmark decade of decisions liberally enabling
consumers to share in proceeds of their insurance policies in spite of
well-crafted clauses and exclusions in uninsured/underinsured contracts of
4
personal automobile insurance providers.

1
professor Legal Writing, Research and Appellate Advocacy, Cleveland Marshall
College of Law, Cleveland State University; R.N., MetroHealth Medical Center; B.A.,
Baldwin Wallace College; J.D., Cleveland Marshall College of Law.
2

Assistant Counsel, United States Department of Defense, Defense Contract
Management Command, Cleveland, B.A., Bowling Green University; J.D., Cleveland
Marshall College of Law, former Senior Editor, Cleveland State Law Review.
3

Hobson's choice is no choice at all. Liveryman Thomas Hobson (1544-1631) was
known for his rule of giving customers the choice of any horse to rent as long as they
took "the horse which stood near the stable door." Richard Steele, The Spectator, No. 509,
Oct. 14, 1712 (quoted from JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS, (Emily
Morrison Beck ed., 15th ed. Little Brown Co. 1980)).
4

1n response to the case law, articles in law reviews in the 90's have chronicled, with
much interest, the resulting changes made by the court in uninsured/underinsured
motorist protection. See, eg., Dominick Cirelli, Jr., Note, Girgis v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., Rescinding the Physical Contact Requirement in Ohio Uninsured Motorist Claims,
30 AKRON L. REV. 153 (1996); Matthew Devery McCormack, Comment, Tracking Ohio
Insurance Coverage: The Genesis and Demise of Savoie, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 293 (1994);
Shawn Gordon Lisle, Comment, The Impact of State Farm v. Alexander on Uninsuredand

HeinOnline -- 45 Clev. St. L. Rev. 699 1997

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:699

The recent Ohio Supreme Court decision of Holt v. Grange Mutual Casualty
Co., 5 is another consumer friendly decision and represents both an equitable
and sound interpretation and application of Ohio law to consumer insurance
contracts. In Holt, the court chastised the insurer for its use of restrictive policy
language to define who was an "insured," under its policy. Holt held such
exclusionary language ineffectual as an impermissible attempt to exclude the
adult sons of a decedent from coverage for wrongful death benefits, for their
father who was killed by an underinsured motorist. The Holts' two adult sons
were valid statutory claimants in his wrongful death but simply did not meet
the Grange policy definition of an "insured" or "family member" because they
6
did not reside in the family home.
The plain truth is that insurers have fought tirelessly throughout the last
decade to craft the policies in clear language to limit or exclude those defined
as "insureds" who are entitled to bring claims under the
uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions of their policies. 7 Insurers have
argued that decisions such as that in Holt will increase consumer's premiums.
Yet, when questioned about the purported increase in payment of
uninsured/underinsured claims, the insurance industry is unable to project the
actual increased costs of such decisions. 8 While consumers have been the
beneficiaries of a liberal Ohio Supreme Court, some state legislators have
vilified the court for "writing law instead of interpreting it."9 Indeed, insurance

UnderinsuredMotorist Coverage Generally, and in Relation to the Owned-But-Not-Insured
Exclusion, 26 AKRON L. REV. 557 (1993); Gary D. Plunkett, Note, Unknown Effects of Wood
v. Shepard on Uninsuredand UnderinsuredMotorist Coverage in Ohio, 39 CLEVE. ST. L. REV.
-,A49(1991).
5683 N.E.2d 1080 (1997).
6Id.
7
See State Farm Auto Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 583 N.E.2d 309 (Ohio 1992)(holding in
syllabus, that "an automobile insurance policy may not eliminate or reduce uninsured
or underinsured motorist coverage.., where the claim or claims of such persons arise
from causes of action that are recognized by Ohio tort law."). But see Hedrick v. Motorists
Mut. Ins. Co., 488 N.E.2d 840 (Ohio 1986)(overruled by Alexander). See also Martin v.
Midwestern Group Ins. Co., 639 N.E.2d 438 (Ohio 1994)(holding that a motorcycle rider
who was badly injured when hit by a drunk uninsured motorist can collect from the
uninsured/underinsured motorist clause of his own automobile policy even though the
rider carried no insurance on the motorcycle). This case was tried by co-author, Thomas
S. Tyler, counsel for Mr. Martin, in the Ohio Supreme Court in 1994.
8
See J. Thomas Henrietta & Thomas H. Bainbridge, Editorial & Comment, Court Acts
to Uphold Uninsured-MotoristLav, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 3, 1994, in which the
authors, the secretary and president of the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, respectively
present a pro-consumer view of the case law. See also Daniel J. Ryan, Au to Profits Weather
Intense Competition, 97 BEST's REVIEW 32, Oct. 1996 for a comprehensive discussion of the
economic success of the 1990's personal automobile insurance market and the most
improved profits since the 1970's.
9
See James Bradshaw, Insurance Ruling May Raise Prices, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Oct. 6, 1994, at IA, in which the author quotes the sentiments of State Senator, Roy L.
Ray, R-Akron, who complains of the decision above in Martin v. Midwestern in this
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industry spokesmen have characterized this line of decisions as consumers
getting "something for nothing."10 A result of this perceived judicial activism
by the Ohio Supreme Court has been a backlash in the Ohio General Assembly
in the form of statutes countermanding these decisions.
Historically, since 1965, the state of Ohio has required insurance companies,
that sell automobile insurance to motorists in this state, to offer
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage to consumers. 11 As the name of
the insurance benefits suggest, uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage
has, as its purpose, the protection of persons from losses resulting from other
12
drivers who cause automobile accidents and who do not have insurance.
While it is difficult to estimate how many uninsured motorists are on the road
in Ohio, statistics indicate that uninsured motorists make up about one-half of
one percent of all drivers involved in automobile accidents in Ohio. 13 A greater
population of Ohio drivers is surely without any automobile insurance at all.
The decision in Holt favors insurance consumers but has alarmed the
insurance industry. The industry perceives the decision as bringing into
question what language of an insurance policy will be upheld under the
freedom of contract and what will be stricken as against public policy. First, the
industry would argue that Holt seems to denigrate and abrogate the rights of
an uninsurance/underinsurance provider to craft its policies according to basic
clear unambiguous language and contract principles. Second, the decision
could be viewed as creating confusion and instability regarding what
provisions insurers may rightfully include in their policies in order to limit their
liability to the public in general. Third, insurance actuaries would state they
have uncertainty in calculating how much an average car owner will need to
pay to take into account these perceived abrogations of the right to contract.

article. State Senator Ray subsequently favored a bill to require Ohio motorists to
purchase uninsured/underinsured coverage on each vehicle they own. This bill was
passed by the General Assembly on June 4, 1997. See H.B. 261,122nd Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Ohio 1997). It amended former OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Anderson 1996)
(amended June 4,1997). Thus, the case law cited herein deals with the "former" § 3937.18
for analytical purposes.
10
See Bradshaw, supra note 9. Both insurance spokesman Bradshaw and Justice
Wright, the dissenting judge in Martin v. Midwestern, were credited with expressing the
same views. This case was followed by the subsequent article. Eg., Alan E.Mazur, Note,
Martin v. Midwestern Group Ins. Co: Somethingfor Nothing, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 667 (1995).
11
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Anderson 1997)(as amended) (requiring the
mandatory offering of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage to consumers in
Ohio).
12
See id. The General Assembly designed uninsured motorist coverage to protect
persons, not vehicles. Thus the court must liberally construe the uninsured motorist
statute in order to effectuate the legislative purpose.
13
See Jodi Nirode, Lawmaker Tries to Ease Liability Law/ProvisionalLicense Mulled, THE
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 1, 1997. The statistical figures regarding the number of
uninsured/underinsured motorists causing accidents on Ohio highways were stated
by Leo Skinner, a spokesman for the Ohio Department of Public Safety.
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Lastly, the decision in Holt sends a message to consumers that they may
challenge a policy's plain language and may recover for losses under public
policy principles, even if the strict letter of the insurance policy would prohibit
recovery.
Thus, insurers and insureds will continue to be impacted by future decisions
dealing with uninsured/underinsured motorist protection because this
protection requires the balancing of contract law with the public policy of
protecting "persons from losses which, because of the tortfeasor's lack of
liability coverage would otherwise go uncompensated." 14
I. FACTS AND TRIAL COURT DECISION

Gawain and Ingrid Holt were insured under a motorist insurance policy
issued to them by Grange Mutual Insurance Company.15 On August 20, 1993,
Gawain Holt was killed in a motor vehicle accident with an underinsured
motorist.16 The uninsured/underinsured motorist provision in the Holt policy
provided coverage with limits of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per
18
accident. 17 Subsequently, Grange paid $250,000 to the estate of Gawain Holt.
Ingrid Holt, as the executor of the estate, sought additional recovery under the
same underinsured motorist policy provision on behalf of the families' two
adult sons, Daniel E. Holt and David W. Holt.19 Mrs. Holt, as decedent's
personal representative, submitted a claim to Grange on behalf of her two
sons. 20 Grange denied the claim because neither adult son was named as an
21
"insured" under the insurance company's definition contained in the policy.
14

See Martin v. Midwestern, 639 N.E.2d 438 (Ohio 1994)(citing Abate v. Pioneer Mut.
Cas. Co., 258 N.E.2d 429, 432 (Ohio 1970)(other citations excluded).
15

Holt v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., No. CA95-11-192, 1996 WL 88542, at *1 (Butler
County Ct. App. March 4, 1996). This intermediate appellate opinion was written by
Judge Walsh who was joined in this majority opinion by both other judges on the panel,
Judges Koehler and Powell.
16
17

Id.

1d.

18Id.
191d.
20

Holt, 1996 WL 88542, at *1.

21

Holt, 683 N.E.2d at 1082. The Supreme Court opinion cited the relevant section,
Part C-- of the Grange policy which stated:
We will pay damages which an insured is legally entitled to recover
from the owner or operator of an uninsured[/underinsured] motor
vehicle because of bodily injury caused by an accident.
The definition of "insured" was set out by the Company as:
"You or any family member ......
Family member is defined as:
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This denial was based on the undisputed fact that neither adult son made his
principal residence at the home of the named insureds, the parents. 22
Mrs. Holt, the plaintiff-appellee then filed a complaint for a declaratory
judgment and damages in the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County on
September 15, 1994.23 After both parties filed motions for summary judgment,
the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Mrs. Holt as the personal
representative of the estate on November 2, 1995.24 Thus, the trial court held
that the insurer was obligated to pay the wrongful death benefits to the other
rightful beneficiaries, the sons. 25 Grange timely appealed this decision to the
26
Twelfth District Court of Appeals, Butler County.
II. THE APPELLATE DECISION

The intermediate appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court,
focusing on both the public policy behind Ohio's wrongful death statute and
its own binding case law.27 The Butler County appellate court first cited to its
decision in Lynch v. State Farm2 8 for the proposition that, based upon nearly
identical facts, the decedent's father and administrator of the insured
decedent's estate was entitled to bring a wrongful death claim on behalf of
himself, as well as decedent's mother and child, who did not reside with
decedent and thus, did not meet State Farm's definition of an "insured." Lynch's
claim was allowed based on the claimants' status as statutory beneficiaries
"regardless of whether [the administrator] or the other wrongful death
29
statutory beneficiaries themselves qualify as insureds under the policy."

"[A] person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption and whose
principal residence is at the location shown in the Declarations."
Id.
22
1d. Again, "Family member" was defined above in the Grange policy as "a person
related to you by blood, marriage or adoption and whose principal residence is at the
location shown in the Declarations."
23

1d.

24

Holt, 1996 WL 88542, at *1.

25683 N.E.2d at 1082.
26

1d. The trial court found the underinsured motorist coverage was available for the
wrongful death claims of the two sons, because "the aforementioned contractual
provision is an impermissible restriction on the insurance coverage which is mandated
by R.C. 3937.18."
27

Holt, 1996 WL 88542, at *1.

28

Lynch v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. CA93-06-099, 1994 WL 93163 (Butler

County Ct. App. March 21, 1994).
29

1d. at *1. Mr. Lynch was killed by an uninsured motorist while driving his
girlfriend's car and State Farm stipulated that he was an insured under the policy.
However, although he was survived by his mother, father, and a minor child, none of
them resided with Lynch at the time of the accident. The court held they indeed could
recover under the policy based on their status as statutory beneficiaries.
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In citing its own recent decision in Lynch, the appellate court relied to a great
extent upon the language of the Ohio wrongful death statute.30 The Butler
County Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and certified its judgment as
31
in conflict with the decisions of certain other district appellate courts.
32
Thereafter, the Ohio Supreme Court allowed a discretionary appeal.
III. THE

OHIO SUPREME COURT MAJORITY OPINION

Justice Alice Robie Resnick, writing for the majority in this 4-3 decision
examined the interplay between the purposes of the uninsured/underinsured
motorist statute3 3 and the wrongful death statutes. 34 The majority affirmed the
court of appeals and characterized the issue as investigating the "effectiveness
of a provider of uninsured/underinsured coverage utilizing a restrictive policy
definition of who is an 'insured' in excluding from coverage the claim of an
uncompensated wrongful death statutory beneficiary."35
In the analysis provided, Justice Resnick begins by citing to the Ohio statute
requiring insurance providers to offer uninsured/underinsured motorist
protection to automobile drivers. 36 The clear legislative purpose of requiring
providers to offer uninsured/underinsured protection under Ohio law, she
writes, is to "provide protection for an insured against loss for bodily injury,
sickness, or disease, including death . . ." due to the collision with an

uninsured/underinsured motorist. 37 Conceivably, since the death of the
insured is contemplated in the legislative policy which requires the insurance
companies to offer uninsured/underinsured benefits to consumers, the

30
See id. (citing OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02 (A)(1)(publisher and date unknown
in this 1996 case as cited by the court) which stated in part as follows:
An action for wrongful death shall be brought in the name of the
personal representative of the decedent for the exclusive benefit of
the surviving spouse, [and] the children... all of whom are rebuttably
presumed to have suffered damages by reason of the wrongful death ....
Id. at *2.
Note this statute has been amended in 1997 and is also referred to as "former" § 2125.02
in the Holt court's opinion.
31

See Berleman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 600 N.E.2d 1145 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992); Thompson v. Utomo, No. L-95-034, 1995 WL 628242 (Lucas County Ct. App. Oct.
27, 1995); Estate of Simone v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 67081, 1994 WL 613876
(Cuyahoga Ct. App. Nov. 3, 1994).
32

See Holt, 683 N.E.2d at 1083.

33

OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3927.18(A)(as amended June 4, 1997 by H.B. 261)

(Anderson 1997).
34683 N.E.2d at 1083.

351d.
36
37

1d. (citing OH-o REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(1)).
Id.
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benefits would ultimately go to those who have a right to claim under the
insured as beneficiaries.
Ohio law, Resnick points out, provides additional statutory protection for
those beneficiaries of wrongful death claims. 38 This statute clearly allows the
personal representative of an estate to bring claims on behalf of "the surviving
spouse, the children, and the parents of the decedent. " 39 There is no limitation
based upon the age or residence of the statutory beneficiaries of a decedent. In
fact, the wrongful death statute contains mandatory language stating that a
decedent's representative "shall" equitably distribute any settlements or other
40
benefits between the beneficiaries.
Relying on the statutes, as well as case law, 41 as the basis for her reasoning,
Resnick concluded with strong language, saying it was "incongruous" for
Grange to attempt to exclude the sons of Gawain Holt from the definition of
"insureds" in the policy when they are statutory beneficiaries under Ohio law.
The attempt by the insurance company to limit by contract who is an insured
must bow to the public policies embodied in the uninsured/underinsured and
wrongful death statutes.
In Lynch4 2 and Dion43, two appellate cases cited extensively by Resnick, there
were no surviving relatives who fell within the policy definitions of "insureds."
Resnick noted that in both cases, the insurer attempted to avoid paying valid
wrongful death claims by narrowly defining and excluding one who could be
44
considered an "insured" under its policy.
In the majority opinion, the Supreme Court recognized the inequity of
writing an insurance policy which would allow recovery in the event of injury,
but which effectively precluded recovery in the event of the insured's death.
Resnick cited with approval the language in Dion as follows:

38

1d. (citing OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02(A)(1)).

39683 N.E.2d at 1084 (citing § 2125.02(A)(1)).
40

d. (citing § 2125.03(A)(1)).

41

See Lynch v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. CA93-060099, 1994 WL 93163
(Butler County Ct. App. March 21, 1994); Dion v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No.
4-91-14, 1992 WL 63281 (Defiance County Ct. App. Mar. 24,1992). Both cases were cited
extensively in Holt and held that uninsured/underinsured coverage was available to
wrongful death claimants who did not qualify as "insureds" in the relevant automobile
policies.
421994 WL 93163.
431992 WL 63281. In Dion, the executrix of the insured decedent's estate brought a
uninsured motorist claim for the wrongful death of the decedent under the decedent's
policy. However, the decedent's children did not qualify as insureds under the policy
due to an endorsement similar to the one in the policy in Lynch. The Third District Court
of Defiance County held precluding such benefits violated Ohio law based on the
wrongful death statute.
44

See 683 N.E.2d at 1080. See also cases cited supra notes 42 & 43.
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The death of a motorist protected by uninsured/underinsured
motorist coverage was intended to be covered under both the statute
and [the] policy. By purchasing [the] policy, [the decedent] was an
insured even though the accident with the underinsured tortfeasor
claimed his life. To hold otherwise would be to prevent recovery
simply because the nature of his injuries was so severe as to cause his
death. This would have the 45effect of altering [the] policy to only
provide coverage for injuries.
Resnick decried the Grange argument that there need be privity of contract
with the statutory beneficiaries (the sons) saying that due to the sons' status as
beneficiaries of the insured-the decedent, the sons need not be in privity with
the insurance carrier.46 Justice Resnick opined that the reasoning cited by
Grange in Wood v. Shepard47 which mandated that some privity of contract exist
between the carrier and the claimant was inapplicable to the Holt claimants due
to the special nature of their claim. 48 Thus, focusing on the significant public
policy of protecting those citizens who do purchase insurance, as required by
Ohio law, from those tortfeasors who do not, Justice Resnick again used strong
language and characterized the Grange position as "absurd" in its attempt to
49
exclude the sons of Gawain Holt from coverage for the wrongful death claim.
The decision in Holt abrogates all prior decisions of the various Ohio District
Courts which held otherwise. 50
IV. THE DISSENT

Justice Cook wrote for the dissent, in which he was joined by Chief Justice
Moyer and Justice Lundberg Stratton. 51 Justice Cook maintained in the dissent
that the law of Ohio dictates that a wrongful death beneficiary cannot recover
under the policy unless he or she qualifies as an "insured" by the policy
definition. 52 Cook based his dissent on the fact that only "insureds" as defined
in the policy are in contractual privity with the insurer.5 3 Furthermore, Cook

45

Dion, 1992 WL 63281, at *3.

46683 N.E.2d at 1087.
47526 N.E.2d 1089, 1093 (Ohio 1988)(holding that only those wrongful death

claimants in contractual privity with the underinsurance provider can be considered to
be covered by the policy).
48683 N.E.2d at 1087.
49

1d. at 1086.

50

See cases cited supra note 31.

51683 N.E.2d at 1088.
52

1d.

53Id. In supporting his reasoning, Cook argues that two cases cited by the majority,
Wood v. Shepard, 526 N.E.2d 1089 (Ohio 1988) and In re Estate of Reeck, 488 N.E.2d 195
(Ohio 1986) compel a result opposed to the majority. Cook distinguishes both of those
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indicates, that the majority's conclusion that contractual privity is not required
because the beneficiaries "step into the shoes" of the decedent is flawed. 54
In his dissent, Justice Cook correctly notes that Ingrid Holt and her sons
55
could have shared the "per person" recovery of $250,000 paid to the estate.
He stated that Ohio law does not demand that there be more than one payment
of the "per person" limits on a policy. 56 Justice Cook wrote that "Ohio law
requires only that uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage be offered. It
does not mandate compensation from a decedent's automobile insurer for all
wrongful death statutory beneficiaries." 57 Finally, Justice Cook defended the
insurer. He opined that an insurer does not act in an inequitable manner toward
an insured by refusing to pay and the fact that an insured suffered compensable
damages, even death, is not sufficient reason to mandate an insurance company
to pay compensation. 58
V. ANALYSIS
The margin of victory for the Holts was slim. The decision was 4 to 3. It causes
one to ponder whether the strictures of Holt will withstand later judicial
scrutiny or the powerful insurance lobby whose efforts to change this decision
in any way possible will inexorably follow. The Ohio legislature responded
quickly and decisively in the 90's to negate the effects of prior Ohio Supreme
Court decisions that have favored the insurance consumer based on public
policy.59 The General Assembly enacted legislation that effectively overruled
60
the case law to force a strict interpretation of insurance contract language.
Automobile insurance is mandatory in the State of Ohio and those
law-abiding citizens who purchase it are entitled to the benefit of their bargain.
The Holts purchased their insurance to obtain benefits for themselves and their
family in the event of their injury or their death. It would be unconscionable to
extrapolate, as the dissent would, that if Ingrid Holt had also died in the tragic
accident with Gawain, no one would have been an "insured" under the
definition in the policy since the adult children did not live in the family home.
Had the decision gone the other way and had both Ingrid and Gawain died in

cases by postulating that they each dealt with claimants who were actually "insureds"
under the policy definitions and thus entitled to recover the benefits.

54Id.
55Id. at 1089.

56683 N.E.2d at 1089.
57
58

1d.
1d.

59

See discussion and cases of Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. 620 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio
1993) and Martin v. Midwestern Group Ins. Co., 639 N.E.2d 438 (Ohio 1994).
60

1d.
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the accident, the Holts, through their heirs, would have received nothing for
their years of paying insurance premiums.
A trend to judicial activism on the part of the appellate courts has caused the
automobile insurance industry and consumers to be unclear regarding which
contractual provisions will be upheld by courts and which provisions will
not.61 Additionally, the Ohio Supreme Court decisions in this area have
spawned reactive legislation designed to overrule opinions which have found
insurance coverage through valid public policy concerns, where none would
exist under the specific terms or exclusions contained in the motorist insurance
contract. One commentator included figures obtained from the Ohio Insurance
Institute to show that in the last decade nearly 900 appellate court decisions
including 75 by the Ohio Supreme Court have involved uninsured/
underinsured motorist protection. 62 Two such uninsured/ underinsured
decisions which have been legislatively overruled are Savoie v. Grange Mutual
64
Insurance Co. 63 and Martin v. Midwestern Group Insurance Co. Both cases
apparently were considered by the Ohio General Assembly to65erode the
freedom to contract and give the insured "something for nothing."
Personal automobile insurance is the most profitable sector in the
burgeoning 1990's property/casualty insurance industry.66 Profit margins

61See Alan E. Mazur, Note, Martin v. Midwestern Group Insurance Co.: Somethingfor
Nothing, 24 CAP. U.L. REV. 667 (1995), for a comprehensive view of the cases in the 90's
which have altered insurance law as well as a critical view of Martin and its reasoning.
62

See id.

63620 N.E.2d 809.
64639 N.E.2d 438.
65

See Bradshaw, supra note 9 as the origin of the quote. See also Savoie v. Grange Mut.
Ins. Co., 620 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio 1993)(overruling State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rose, 575
N.E.2d 459 (Ohio 1991)) and paragraphs one and two of the syllabus of Burris v. Grange
Mut. Cas., 545 N.E.2d 83 (Ohio 1989). In Savoie, the court held, among other things, that
policies which limited the wrongful death damages suffered by individuals into one
per person" policy limit were unenforceable. Thus, when there is more than one family
member, each member can make a claim for the entire "per person" policy amount until
the maximum "per accident" limit was satisfied. The legislature returned the state of the
law prior to Savoie in Senate Bill 20 in 1994 which amended OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3937.02 (Anderson 1997).
See Martin v. Midwestern Group Ins. Co., 639 N.E.2d 438 (Ohio 1994)(overruling
Hedrick v. Motorists Mutual Ins. Co., 448 N.E.2d 840 (Ohio 1986)). Martin held that
purchasing uninsured motorist coverage on only one vehicle would extend ones
uninsured motorist protection to all owned vehicles. Id. The General Assembly moved
quickly to enact legislation to overrule Martin and effectively did so in 1997 with more
additions to § 3937.02.
66

See Daniel J. Ryan, Automobile Profits WeatherIntense Competition, 97 BEST'S REVIEW
32, Oct. 1996 availablein 1996 WL 8643263 ALLNEWS. "Improved auto-safety features,
a maturing baby-boomer population, a general improvement in driver behavior, slower
growth in medical costs and stricter enforcement of drunken-driving laws have
contributed to a favorable trend in claims frequency and severity." Id.
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have reached their highest level since the 1970's. 67 Interestingly, the angst of
the insurers regarding Martin which held that uninsured motorist protection
followed the "person" not the vehicle was all smoke and mirrors. 68 While
insurance companies alleged they would have to raise premiums to plan for
unknown vehicle coverage, they actually charged customers more money to
drop uninsured motorist coverage on other owned vehicles than to carry it.69
More importantly, however, insurance premiums should be based upon the
risk that they are designed and intended to protect against. Consequently, they
should rise in proportion to the increased risk of paying more claims.
Uninsured/underinsured motorist protection is related to the risk of being hit
by an uninsured/underinsured motorist. This risk is nearly constant since it
relates to the number of uninsured/underinsured drivers on Ohio highways
on any given day. It does not increase based upon the number of cars someone
owns or number of beneficiaries that someone has.
Holt extends uninsured/underinsured motorist protection to the legitimate
beneficiaries accorded the wrongful death benefits by Ohio statute. Gawain
Holt, like most of us, likely paid insurance premiums for many decades to
ensure that he and his family would be taken care of in the event he was injured
or killed. The insurance company would have denied his lawful heirs, his own
two children, benefits because they no longer lived in the same home as he. In
Holt,accepting the argument of the insurance company and that of the dissent,
the beneficiaries would receive "nothing for something." 70 Consequently, the
premiums paid by Gawain Holt for uninsured/underinsured motorist
protection would garner nothing in the way of rightful compensation for his
wrongful death for his two adult children.
Insurance companies are in the business of actuarial prediction and can
compute premiums based on the numbers of uninsured/underinsured
motorists within a state. Holt is, therefore, unlike the above line of cases found
to be providing unanticipated and unplanned for protection, allegedly
contrary to the contract terms. In addition, the Grange policy has, not only a
67

1d. See also N.K. Chidambaran et al., An Investigation of the Performance of the U.S.

Property-LiabilityInsurance Industry, 64 J. RISK & INS. 371 (1997), available in 1997 WL

10879312. This article discusses the over $235 Billion of consumer premiums written per
year and analyzes the intensity of competition for the insurance dollar.
68
Articles in the press and law reviews followed predicting dire consequences for
automobile insurance rates, yet rates are stable and profits in the industry seem to be
better than ever.
69

Underinsured/uninsured coverage is a great bargain compared to liability and
collision expense. Our personal experience, following Martin, was that a quote to drop
our uninsured motorist coverage on two of three owned vehicles would cost
significantly more than what paying for the uninsured motorist coverage cost. This
quote was per our Farmer insurance representative. It was explained to us that this was
so because the exclusion of the coverage would require a non-standard policy which
cost more to write than including the insurance itself.
70

See Bradshaw, supranote 9 for the origin of the quote "something for nothing" based
on the decision in Martin.

HeinOnline -- 45 Clev. St. L. Rev. 709 1997

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:699

"per person" limit, but a "per accident" limit built in to it which can provide the
insurer with a predictable maximum payout.
Response to the decision in Holt may be swift. It will undoubtedly be fought
on either of two fronts. The first is that similar cases may be accepted by the
Ohio Supreme Court to test the efficacy and stability of Holt. Holt may be
upheld, reversed, or modified, depending on whether there are changes in the
Justices on the court. The fact that Holt is a closely decided 4-3 decision makes
the decision tenuous and highly susceptible to modification or overruling with
even one new member of the Ohio Supreme Court.
A second, and more likely possibility, is that the General Assembly may
again enact legislation to uphold the insurance companies' right to enforce
carefully drafted exclusions in its contracts. This response would be similar to
the actions taken by the General Assembly in response to both Savoie and
Martin.71 The industry will certainly not remain sanguine regarding this latest
decision by the Ohio Supreme Court.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Ohio Supreme Court has taken a significant and laudable step to support
the public policy considerations embodied in the uninsured/underinsured
insurance statute and wrongful death statute at the expense of the narrowly
drafted language imposed upon consumers in contracts crafted by insurance
companies. The court has expressed an interest in encouraging the citizens of
this state to be financially responsible and to purchase insurance when they
operate vehicles. Gawain and Ingrid Holt did just that when they purchased
the Grange policy.72 Under the wrongful death statute, the Holts' sons were
entitled to recover damages for the death of their father regardless of the fact
that they did not live in the family home. The Ohio Supreme Court blended
the public policies of two statutes to reach a decision that is both equitable and
just.
Any other decision on the part of this court would send a message to the
insurance consumer that would indicate an insurer may withhold rightfully
earned wrongful death benefits from legitimate statutory beneficiaries by
fashioning clever language in contracts that too many of us do not take the time
to read or understand. Moreover, despite the insurance industry's cry that
insurance premiums will skyrocket, the impact on benefits paid out will be
negligible. Actuaries can anticipate and provide for this risk. It is more
important to protect persons who obey the law, buy insurance and intend to
obtain protection from accidents caused by uninsured motorists by responsibly
paying premiums, than to protect the insurer's right to contract.

71 see cases and discussion cited supra notes 62-65.
72

Holt, 683 N.E.2d at 1082.
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